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Heather Sertial* 
This Note elaborates on the introduction of a new legal structure for 
organizations known as the “hybrid entity.” A hybrid encompasses 
aspects of both the for-profit model, to generate revenue; as well as 
the nonprofit model, to distribute funds to a community in need. The 
objective of this Note is to offer a structural guide to entrepreneurs 
who are interested in this new model. This Note first examines the 
limitations of for-profits that would like to contribute to social goals, 
as well as the limitations of nonprofits that wish to increase their 
revenues. This Note then discusses two current statutory models for 
the hybrid: the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company in the United 
States, and the Community Interest Company in the United 
Kingdom. Finally, this note elaborates on a current international 
movement, known as the Economy of Communion, to enable the 
reader to visualize the social impact of a hybrid structure. In 
particular, this Note focuses on the intricacies of how to distribute 
profits in such a model. The Note concludes by offering the 
Economy of Communion as one efficient means of distributing 
profits, and enumerates ways the United States' model can learn 
from its counterparts abroad.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Both nonprofit and for-profit organizations in the United States and 
abroad have achieved various levels of success towards their social 
goals through traditional legal structures. Nonprofits have generated 
revenue to provide a range of services to the poor, including healthcare, 
job training, employment, legal services, and education.1 Likewise, for-
profit firms have generated capital to offer investors attractive stock 
dividends, with investors making their own contributions to 
corresponding nonprofits.2 Nevertheless, both nonprofits and for-profits 
alike have faced obstacles in attempting to take these contributions a 
step further. As a result, some organizations have sought out a different 
                                                                                                                                
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Economics, 
Theology, Fordham University. I would like to thank Professor Amelia Uelmen for her 
invaluable guidance and for making this Note possible, and my family and friends for 
their endless support. 
 1. Hadley Rose, Comment, The Social Business: The Viability of a New Business 
Entity Type, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 131, 136 (2007); see also Michael D. Gottesman, 
Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road Forward for the Creation 
of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 347 (2007). 
 2. Rose, supra note 1, at 155; Matthew F. Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social 
Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 
303 (2010). 
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legal structure that would afford them more flexibility.3 One such 
solution is the new “hybrid entity, which combines aspects of both 
nonprofit and for-profit entities.”4 Two forms of hybrids that have 
achieved statutory approval are the Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Companies (“L3Cs”) in the United States and the Community Interest 
Companies (“CICs”) in the United Kingdom.5 Although scholars have 
examined the legal structure of these new entities,6 there has been 
limited discussion on how hybrids can effectively distribute their 
profits.7 
The purpose of this Note is to explore a possible structure that 
allows hybrids to distribute their profits. Part I discusses the two 
“classic” structures from which the hybrid structure emerged: nonprofit 
and for-profit entities. Part I also outlines the limitations faced by the 
classic structures in achieving their social goals and introduces the 
hybrid entity as a response to these limitations. Part I concludes by 
                                                                                                                                
 3. See Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of 
Capitalism to Consider the Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743, 
758 (2009/2010) (noting that the hybrid model offers the nonprofit component greater 
flexibility in generating revenue since for-profits, in issuing stock, can generate profit 
that the nonprofit may not be able to produce). 
 4. The “hybrid” seeks to generate a substantial amount of revenue, as for-profits 
do, and also seeks to distribute a large proportion of these profits for social goals, as 
nonprofits do. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended 
Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 619 (2010) (noting that statutory law is catching 
up with the blurring lines between nonprofit and for-profit entities in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom); Doeringer, supra note 2, at 292 (noting that even 
though a “hybrid” has various definitions, it can still be understood to be “any business 
organization which takes into account human society or the welfare of human beings”); 
see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 756 (noting that there are different names for hybrids, 
such as B Corporation, fourth-sector businesses, social enterprise, and creative 
capitalism). 
 5. See infra Part II (discussing the legal structures of L3Cs and CICs). 
 6. See generally, Reiser, supra note 4; Doeringer, supra note 2; Taylor, supra 
note 3; Rose, supra note 1; Gottesman, supra note 1. 
 7. It is generally agreed upon that a proportion of the profits must be used for 
investment, and some would be distributed for social purposes, but there is no rigid 
structure for the division of these profits. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 758 (stating that 
some of the portion of the proceeds from the sales of stock could be given to the 
nonprofit component); see also Doeringer, supra note 2, at 310 (noting that the U.K. 
defines hybrids as businesses with primarily social goals whose surpluses are reinvested 
for that social goal either in the business or in the community, instead of for the benefit 
of the shareholders, as in for-profit entities). 
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highlighting a new international movement, known as the Economy of 
Communion, which offers hybrid entities a possible structure for the 
distribution of profits. Part II provides a statutory analysis of the L3C 
model in the United States, and the CIC model in the United Kingdom, 
and argues that these models have provided an insufficient structure for 
the distribution of profits. Part III suggests lessons that these models can 
learn from their counterparts across the globe, and argues that the 
Economy of Communion model for distributing profits is an effective 
distribution structure that could feasibly be applied to both the L3C and 
CIC models, enabling them to generate revenue while contributing to 
social goals. 
I. PART I: EXPERIMENT—THE NEW HYBRID 
In order to understand why the hybrid movement evolved, and why 
traditional nonprofit and for-profit models face limitations in achieving 
their social goals, Section A discusses the legal structures of nonprofit 
and for-profit entities and analyzes the challenges nonprofits face in 
generating revenue and the challenges that for-profits face in 
distributing profits to a group other than the shareholders. Next, Section 
B examines the rise of the hybrid entity, its objectives and its legal 
structure. Finally, Section C discusses a new Catholic social thought 
movement, the Economy of Communion, which also uses the hybrid 
form to achieve social goals. 
A. THE TWO CLASSIC MODELS 
1. The Nonprofit Charity 
a. The United States 
While U.S. nonprofit organizations are dedicated to serving a 
community interest, they face various challenges in generating profits.8 
                                                                                                                                
 8. Taylor, supra note 3, at 752 (noting that because nonprofits are barred from 
generating profits they are prevented from taking maximum advantage of the power of 
the market, even though this impediment has been reduced over time by nonprofits 
linking themselves to for-profit ventures); see also Doeringer, supra note 2, at 297 
(noting that nonprofits seeking to pursue commercial activities can create obstacles in 
receiving tax benefits, since nonprofits must meet certain regulation to maintain their 
tax-exempt status). 
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For example, in the United States, the defining characteristics of a 
nonprofit are that the organization is exempted from federal income 
taxes and able to receive tax-deductible grants.9 In order to maintain this 
tax-exempt status, nonprofits must meet the requirements of various 
regulations if they attempt to generate profits, namely those of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”).10 For the purposes of this Note, the 
most important sections of the I.R.C. that detail the requirements of a 
nonprofit organization are the following: (1) it must be operated 
exclusively, (2) for an exempt purpose, and (3) profits cannot be used 
for private or shareholder interest.11 The section posing the most 
difficulty to nonprofits seeking to generate profits is the “operated 
exclusively” requirement.12 The exclusivity test may appear to mean that 
nonprofits cannot pursue profits unless the business activity is wholly 
directed toward the exempt purpose, however, the exclusivity test 
actually means that only an insubstantial part of the nonprofit’s 
activities can be in furtherance of a non-exempt purpose.13 Nevertheless, 
determining what level of business activity constitutes an “insubstantial” 
amount remains a challenge, and exceeding that amount can cause the 
nonprofit to forego its exempt status.14 In addition, even if the nonprofit 
satisfies all the requirements in conducting for-profit activity, it still 
                                                                                                                                
 9. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 296-97; see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 753 
(noting the constraints stemming from the Internal Revenue Code requirements if the 
nonprofit wants to maintain its tax-exempt status and add for-profit activities). 
 10. Section 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C. sets out the basic criteria for tax-exempt status 
for an organization, which is essentially to be organized and operated exclusively for an 
exempt purpose identified by the Internal Revenue Services, specifically “religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational” purposes, and 
where earnings cannot be used to benefit any private shareholder or individual. I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3) (2006). 
 11. See id. 
 12. Taylor, supra note 3, at 753 (noting that this requirement is a more serious 
concern than the other sections of the statute, if the nonprofit seeks to engage in 
business activities).  
 13. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 753 (noting that when engaging in for-profit 
activities, the entity must operate primarily for one or more exempt purposes, and under 
the operational test, only an insubstantial part of activities can be to further a non-
exempt purpose); Doeringer, supra note 2, at 298 (stating that substantial commercial 
activity is allowed as long as it furthers the organizations exempt purpose). 
 14. Taylor, supra note 3, at 753; see also Doeringer, supra note 2, at 298 (noting 
that it is unclear where the boundaries are that allow an entity to engage in commercial 
activity and still remain a nonprofit, and that courts have not offered any certainty). 
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must pay an unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”), which attaches to 
all business activity that is not substantially related to the nonprofit’s 
exempt purpose.15 This tax poses a further disincentive for nonprofits to 
engage in for-profit activity.16 
Another challenge that nonprofits face in engaging in business 
activity in the United States is their limited ability to access capital, 
since they are prohibited from distributing profits to individuals who 
exercise control over the company.17 Thus, since nonprofits are barred 
from equity capital markets and generating a return for investors, 
nonprofits must rely primarily on grants and donations for their survival, 
which are often insufficient to further their social goals.18 Some argue 
that nonprofits should rely on foundations, or increase their external 
funding to qualify for Program Related Investments (“PRIs”), which are 
financial instruments created by the foundation to generate a return for 
the foundation from the nonprofit entity in which it invests. The primary 
goal of PRIs is the furtherance of the foundation’s missions.19 This 
seems to follow the for-profit model more closely, and is a way for 
nonprofits to generate returns.20 The problem however, is that PRIs are 
                                                                                                                                
 15. See I.R.C. § 513(a). 
 16. Taylor, supra note 3, at 754 (noting that the requirement to pay UBIT adds to 
costs and complexities, thus discouraging nonprofits from engaging in for-profit 
activity); see also Doeringer, supra note 2, at 300 (noting that UBIT serves as a serious 
restriction on the nonprofit’s activities). 
 17. Taylor, supra note 3, at 754 (“Law prohibits nonprofits from ‘distributing 
profits, or net earnings to individuals who exercise control over them, such as its 
directors, officers or members.’”) (quoting Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 (1981)). 
 18. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 301-02; Taylor, supra note 3, at 754 (noting 
that nonprofits remain primarily dependent on grants and donations for survival, 
without which they must pay high costs for capital). 
 19. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 754 (explaining that PRIs are one way for 
nonprofits to receive external funding without engaging in for-profit activities); see also 
Gottesman, supra note 1, at 349-50 (“PRIs, which are investments, primarily in the 
form of loans, in for-profits that help accomplish the foundation’s goals.”); see also 
Thomas J. Billitteri, Aspen Institute, Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, Mixing Mission 
and Business: Does Social Enterprise Need a New Legal Approach? Highlights from an 
Aspen Institute Roundtable 5 (2007), available at http://www.community-wealth.org/_ 
pdfs/news/recent-articles/04-07/report-billiterri.pdf (noting that a PRI might be a loan, 
loan guarantee, or even an equity investment in a commercial enterprise that has a 
charitable purpose). 
 20. Taylor, supra note 3, at 754 (noting that PRIs would model the for-profit model 
more closely by offering foundations financial and programmatic returns); see also 
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not widely used.21 PRIs require complex documentation which increases 
legal and administrative costs, and they do not have a coordinated 
market which limits the ability of smaller foundations to enter the 
field.22 Furthermore, PRIs must assume the risk of evaluating and 
monitoring the legitimacy and performance of the nonprofit entity, and 
the foundation can incur penalties via excise taxes if the IRS decides an 
investment is not in furtherance of the foundation’s goals.23 
b. The United Kingdom 
The nonprofit legal structure in the United Kingdom (U.K.), known 
as a charity, is similar in many ways to that of the United States.24 
Similar to the United States, U.K. charities can engage in a limited 
amount of commercial activity, but only if the activity directly furthers 
the entity’s charitable purpose beyond simply raising funds.25 If the 
charity wants to raise more than an insubstantial amount of commercial 
activity, it must set up a separate limited liability company26 called a 
“trading company,” and that company’s profits can then be donated to 
the charity.27 The difficulty is that the trading company cannot give 
beyond its surplus because doing so increases administrative costs, and 
it will face complications in adhering to regulatory requirements.28 
Recognizing these limitations on hybrid activity, the Social Enterprise 
                                                                                                                                
Doeringer, supra note 2, at 316 (noting that PRIs create the possibility of raising a 
significant amount of capital for hybrid entities). 
 21. Gottesman, supra note 1, at 350 (observing that in practice, nonprofits rarely 
make PRIs). 
 22. Taylor, supra note 3, at 755. 
 23. See Billitteri, supra note 19, at 5-6 (noting that foundations rarely make PRIs 
because of the strict limitations placed on them, such as incurring penalties if the IRS 
decides an investment is inconsistent with the foundation’s mission); see also 
Gottesman, supra note 1, at 350 (contending that one reason why nonprofits do not 
make PRIs is because they fear they will be subject to excise taxes if they make an 
investment in a for-profit that the IRS decides is not in furtherance of the foundation’s 
goals). 
 24. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 311. 
 25. Id. 
 26. These are similar to Limited Liability Companies in the United States. See 
infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 27. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 311. 
 28. Id. . at 312. 
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Unit recommended to Parliament that the government create a new 
business entity geared towards the needs of hybrid activity.29 This was 
the CIC, discussed in Part II.B 
2. The For-Profit Firm 
a. The United States 
United States for-profit firms have a legal duty to maximize 
shareholder profits, so if tensions arise between maximizing profit and 
maximizing public benefit, directors are legally obliged to choose profit 
over public benefit.30 This is expressed in Dodge v. Ford: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself . . . .31 
 
Therefore, the “shareholder profit maximization” duty may make it 
difficult for corporations when they act to promote the social good.32 
The challenge faced by for-profits is that while they can generate profits, 
for-profits have difficulty committing to a social mission.33 For example, 
a for-profit may want to act for the social good by giving donations, 
either to boost employee morale, or to gain public approval.34 It is 
                                                                                                                                
 29. Id. 
 30. Gottesman, supra note 1, at 350. 
 31. 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919). 
 32. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 304 (“[T]here still remains the risk of 
shareholder derivative suits if profits are not reinvested to create economic gains or 
distributed to the shareholders. Consequently, the social enterprise’s interest in 
reinvesting profits toward social purposes could easily be viewed as conflicting with the 
shareholders’ interest of increasing the economic return on their shares.”). 
 33. Gottesman, supra note 1, at 350 (“[T]he primary problem for-profits face in our 
binary legal system is an inability to commit themselves to achieving social goals.”); 
Taylor, supra note 3, at 747 (“The profit-maximizing, shareholder-primacy model of 
corporate law leaves little room to consider how corporations might act to promote the 
social good.”). 
 34. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585-86 (N.J. 1953) 
(holding that a New Jersey pipe manufacture company could make donations to 
Princeton University even though this was not recognized in the company charter). The 
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arguable that corporations can fulfill their desire to act for the social 
good by raising revenues and then giving donations or grants to the 
charitable purpose.35 Yet a limitation to this theory is that donations 
exceeding ten percent of profits are taxed at the corporate income tax 
rate, giving corporations a disincentive to donate large or 
“unreasonable” amounts.36 
It can also be argued that the limited liability company (“LLC”), 
another for-profit entity form distinct from a corporation, can be used as 
a business vehicle to further social goals, as opposed to use of a hybrid 
entity.37 For example, in most jurisdictions, including Delaware, LLC 
law allows the company to establish voting interests in any manner the 
company chooses, and does not require the LLC to comply with the 
standards of publicly traded corporations (if they do not trade 
publicly).38 Furthermore, under Delaware law, LLCs can eliminate 
fiduciary duties of owners and members in their charters to one another, 
the entity, or third parties, making it possible for the LLC to state in its 
operating agreement that its mission is social good, not profit-
                                                                                                                                
Barlow court reasoned that as long as there was some benefit to the company—in this 
case local recognition might bring the company more business—activity outside 
shareholder primacy must be allowed. Id. 
 35. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 304 (noting that for-profits can donate to 
corresponding charities, and are allowed tax-deductions for up to 10% of their profits); 
see also I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A)(2006). 
 36. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 304 (noting that donations to charity above 
10% are taxed at the corporate income tax rate. Although state laws do not restrict 
donations to this 10% level, the laws are interpreted to authorize only “reasonable” 
giving. Courts have applied the 10% level from the tax code, thereby providing some 
guidance to determine if a charitable gift is “reasonable” and amounts to actionable 
corporate waste); see also Billitteri, supra note 19, at 3 (“The charitable activities of 
many commercial firms suggest that in the absence of discriminatory tax treatment, for-
profit charities would flourish.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 37. Taylor, supra note 3, at 751 (noting that LLCs offer a great deal of flexibility to 
create any management structure preferred); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) 
(2011) (“It is the policy of [Delaware’s LLC statute] to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 
agreements.”). 
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(d) (non-economic ownership interests); id. § 
18-302(a) (voting interests); Taylor, supra note 3, at 751 (“LLCs need not comply with 
federal regulations and standards imposed upon publicly traded corporations or the 
listing standards of the various exchanges if they do not trade publicly.”). 
270 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
maximization.39 Nevertheless, the LLC model may still be seen as an 
unattractive vehicle to further social goals since LLCs will not receive 
the tax advantages that nonprofits receive, and the complete elimination 
of fiduciary duties, though permitted, has yet to be tested.40 Indeed, the 
LLC model was not traditionally intended to allow businesses to 
actively advance social good.41 It therefore stands to reason that a 
straight LLC model may not be the best model to organize a business 
with the purpose of advancing a social good.42 
b. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom also has a similar for-profit structure to the 
United States.43 United Kingdom Company Law is similar to U.S. 
Corporate Law,44 insofar as the main goal for a U.K. company is profit-
maximization.45 The most recent form of company law, the limited 
liability partnership (“LLP”), was passed in 2000.46 The structure of the 
LLP adopts elements of existing rules and principles of both partnership 
                                                                                                                                
 39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). 
 40. Taylor, supra note 3, at 752; see also Craig Langstraat & Dianne Jackson, 
Choice of Business Tax Entity after the 1993 Tax Act, 11 AKRON TAX J. 1, 5 (1995) 
(noting that LLCs were designed to combine pass-through attributes of the partnership 
and limited liability). 
 41. See Langstraat & Jackson, supra note 40, at 6 (reasoning that while the model 
may be flexible enough to accommodate such ventures, there may be problems of 
identifying the goals of any particular LLC, which would cause confusion as to which 
are the traditional LLCs and the socially intended LLCs. This would blur clarity in the 
marketplace, an important tool when advancing social good); see also Taylor, supra 
note 3, at 752. 
 42. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 752. 
 43. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 311 (noting that before passage of the CIC into 
the U.K. Companies Act, the options in the United Kingdom were similar to those 
available in the United States: limited companies and charities). 
 44. Compare Companies Act, 2006 (Eng.), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2011).  
 45. See Stuart R. Cross, The Community Interest Company: More Confusion in the 
Quest for Limited Liability?, 55 N.I.L.Q. 302, 305 (2004) (“[C]ompanies legislation 
was not designed with the needs of smaller scale community-based social enterprises in 
mind . . . . [T]he company ‘brand’ is almost exclusively associated with profit-
making.”); see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (citing to Dodge v. Ford, 
which legalizes the "shareholder profit maximization" duty on behalf of directors). 
 46. Id. at 302. The LLP is only available for use by those carrying on business in 
the United Kingdom, therefore making it unavailable for not-for-profit organizations. 
See id. at 303. 
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and company law in the United Kingdom.47 The LLP was thought to be 
able to suit social enterprise efforts, but this proved inadequate.48 
Therefore, with company law leaving its owners with the primary 
responsibility of profit-maximization, the U.K. government saw it 
appropriate to form the CIC, discussed in Part II.B.49 
B. THE HYBRID ENTITY: OBJECTIVE AND LEGAL STRUCTURE 
The characteristic that distinguishes the hybrid entity from the 
classic models discussed above is its purpose. While hybrids do 
ordinarily work within the capitalist structure by operating a business, 
their goals are not purely financial and their primary duty extends 
beyond serving shareholder interest.50 Their purpose is to succeed 
financially and to do good for the community.51 Therefore, the hybrid 
provides a helpful structure to meet the needs of organizations with 
broader purposes.52 
                                                                                                                                
 47. Id. at 304. 
 48. Id. at 302 (“The UK Company Law Review (CLR) also sought to make the 
limited liability company more attractive to smaller businesses.”); id. at 304 (noting that 
the LLP is inherently corporate in nature, and thus the process of adopting a corporate 
character for the LLP intertwined with partnership law principles gives rise to a 
potential weakness in the LLP). 
 49. See id. at 306 (reasoning that the establishment of the CIC, drawing on 
company law but with additional constraints and features, makes it suitable for small 
scale, community-based nonprofit social enterprises familiar with the company form). 
 50. See Billitteri, supra note 19, at 4 (“[H]ybrid groups typically work within the 
capitalist system, earning income and operating in a businesslike manner, but their 
goals are not purely financial and their duty is far broader than serving just the interests 
of shareholders.”); see also Doeringer, supra note 2, at 293 (defining hybrids as entities 
who operate in the commercial sector, but whose core interests are traditionally 
associated with the nonprofit sector). 
 51. See Billitteri, supra note 19, at 4 (“[T]hey strive not only to succeed financially 
but also to do good, using a blend of traditional corporate methods and progressive 
social approaches such as sharing governing power with employees and community 
members and hewing to rigorous outcome standards.”); see also Doeringer, supra note 
2, at 292 (noting that hybrids are business organizations, but they also take into account 
the welfare of human beings). 
 52. An example of this could be nonprofits that want to pursue commercial 
activities, or for-profits that want to contribute to social goals on a greater level. See 
Billitteri, supra note 19, at 8 (“[T]here is a considerable gap between what people want 
from the organizations they interact with as stakeholders and what they are actually 
getting. Required are new organizational models that can do a better job of meeting 
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Although the exact structure varies among firms, hybrid models 
ordinarily connect the goals of a for-profit corporation and a nonprofit 
charity.53 One example of a well-known social enterprise is Google.org, 
which is a for-profit company that is also dedicated to social benefit.54 
Google.com funded Google.org with a grant of three million shares, and 
has pledged to contribute one percent of its annual profits to 
Google.org.55 What is unique about Google.org is that, in addition to 
funding grants to support social causes, it also makes for-profit 
investments, which encourages employees to participate directly in 
furthering changes in company policy.56 While Google.org’s structure 
may vary from other hybrids, it serves as a good example of a for-profit 
company that takes social issues into consideration.  
                                                                                                                                
people’s needs under these new and unprecedented circumstances.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 53. Taylor, supra note 3, at 756; see also Gottesman, supra note 1, at 345 (noting 
that the hybrid expresses the efforts that for-profits and nonprofits have made to 
converge upon a middle ground). 
 54. Taylor, supra note 3, at 757 (observing that Google.org is a for-profit company, 
with the declared purpose of taking on social issues); see also Gottesman, supra note 1, 
at 345-46 (noting that Google.org is legally classified as a for-profit, but acts like a 
nonprofit foundation by making grants to organizations to address social issues). 
 55. Explaining their rationale for this, the founders of the company stated that “we 
will be better served – as shareholders and in all other ways – by a company that does 
good things for the world even if we forego some short-term gains.” Taylor, supra note 
3, at 757 (quoting Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Amendment No. 9 to Registration 
Statement (Form S-1), Letter from the Founders: “An Owner’s Manual” for Google 
Shareholders (Aug. 18, 2004)) (noting that Google.com has committed $75 million in 
investments and grants, a grant of three million shares, and one percent of its annual 
profits, to Google.org); see also About Us: What is Google.org?, GOOGLE.ORG, 
http://google.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). A grant of shares is a restricted 
stock award by a company to an individual (usually an employee) that requires either 
no or a nominal payment by the recipient. Definition of Restricted Stock, MIMI.HU, 
http://en.mimi.hu/stockmarket/restricted_stock.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
 56. Taylor, supra note 3, at 757 (“Google.org is untraditional in that it also makes 
for-profit investments, encouraging Google employees to participate directly and 
lobbying public officials for changes in policies.”); see also About Us: What is 
Google.org?, GOOGLE.ORG, http://google.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
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1. Purpose Behind the Economics: Economy of Communion Project in 
Italy and Brazil 
a. Background and History 
As later discussed in Part II, many of the statutory requirements to 
form these hybrid entities require a “charitable or educational” 
purpose.57 Indeed, many statutes state as a requirement that “but for the 
charitable purpose, the company would not have been formed.”58 Such a 
prerequisite directly relates the purpose of the entity to the distribution 
of profits, as a portion of the profits would be re-distributed to the 
charitable purpose. This relationship can be more clearly illustrated with 
an examination of the Economy of Communion (“EoC”), a social 
movement focused on companies and raising revenue to further social 
good.59 
The EoC emerged as a project within the Focolare Movement, 
which traces its origins to Trent, Italy during World War II (hereinafter 
“the Movement”).60 By 1943, the prolonged warfare had devastated the 
industrial and agricultural infrastructure of Italy, leaving many in severe 
poverty.61 When Trent was heavily bombed, many lost their homes and 
their loved ones.62 Chiara Lubich, the founder of the Movement, and her 
friends tried to respond to the immediate needs of the people and relieve 
their suffering by living out the Christian message of helping others.63 
                                                                                                                                
 57. See infra Parts II.A (discussing L3Cs), II.B (discussing CICs). 
 58. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(ii) (2011). To date, there has not 
been any significant case law concerning this statute. 
 59. See infra notes 72, 76-77 and accompanying text (describing the social goal 
behind generating profits in the EoC model). 
 60. See LORNA GOLD, NEW FINANCIAL HORIZONS: THE EMERGENCE OF AN 
ECONOMY OF COMMUNION 40 (2010) (observing that the origins of the Movement can 
be traced back to the city of Trent, during the Second World War); see also THOMAS 
MASTERS & AMY UELMEN, FOCOLARE: LIVING A SPIRITUALITY OF UNITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 24 (2011) (noting that the first Focolare house emerged out of a response to 
WWII disasters). 
 61. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 41 (characterizing the severe poverty, brutality, 
and suspicion by neighbor and friends in northern Italy in 1943, which led to the 
destruction of many communities); see also MASTERS & UELMEN, supra note 60, at 24 
(noting that air raids destroyed neighborhoods and homes). 
 62. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 63. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 41-42; see also MASTERS & UELMEN, supra note 
60, at 24-25 (noting that Chiara and some of her friends did not escape to the mountains 
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Although she had no intention of starting an organization of any kind, 
what emerged was an inter-faith and multi-cultural global movement, 
grounded in values that are common to all, such as increasing love, 
peace, and understanding.64 For her various contributions to building a 
culture of dialogue and understanding between people of different 
religions, social classes and ethnic backgrounds, Lubich has been 
awarded numerous honorary degrees and appointed an Honorary 
President of the World Council for Religions for Peace in 1997.65 
The meaning of the word “focolare” has an interesting relation to 
the Movement at large. There are four translations for the Italian word 
focolare: “hearth,” “fireside,” “furnace,” and “home,” meaning more 
than just a home, but the most intimate image of family, love, security, 
and warmth.66 Thus, it is no coincidence that focolare became the title of 
a global movement that promotes peace and unity in the world.67 At the 
root of the Movement, is a commitment to treating everyone as 
“family,” as a way of uniting people to one another to work as a 
community to further social good.68 
                                                                                                                                
with family, but instead lived in a small apartment and sheltered others who were 
forsaken). 
 64. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 59 (noting that although the Movement is most 
developed in Italy, Brazil, Argentina, and the Philippines, all countries with a high 
population of Catholics, the Focolare “is not the exclusive domain of Christians, [but] . 
. . has brought about a greater understanding between peoples of different religious 
traditions . . . who translate the basic principles of love into their own theological 
traditions”); see also MASTERS & UELMEN, supra note 60, at 34 (noting that inter-faith 
dialogue has developed with Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Jewish friends). 
 65. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 39; see also MASTERS & UELMEN, supra note 58, 
at 35 (recognizing Lubich’s honorary citizenships in various countries). 
 66. GOLD, supra note 60, at 51; see Amelia Uelmen & Luigino Bruni, Religious 
Values and Corporate Decision Making: The Economy of Communion Project, 11 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 645, 647-48 (2006) (“Focolare was the nickname given to 
the initial group because of the warm family-atmosphere that people found at the first 
informal gatherings.”). 
 67. GOLD, supra note 60, at 39 (noting that it was not a coincidence that focolare 
became the first nickname and eventually title of the Economy of Communion Project); 
see also Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 648 (noting that the Movement’s specific 
aim is to work for unity within the Church for relationships of peace and understanding 
between people of different religions, cultures, and social backgrounds). 
 68. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 40; see also Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 
648 (noting that the Movement’s early lifestyle reflected a profound cultural intuition—
that the essence of human experience is to be “in communion.”). 
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The Focolare began as a small scale project, but was spread 
throughout the world by word of mouth and seemingly chance meetings, 
as well as through the example of people involved in the Movement.69 
For example, the Movement spread to Brazil after a member of a 
religious order from Recife, Brazil visited Italy and met with members 
of the Movement in 1957.70 Since then, the Movement has disseminated 
throughout Brazil, and has generated over one hundred social welfare 
projects.71 
Soon enough, however, the Focolare founders realized that a 
simple sharing of material goods and resources was no longer a 
sufficient strategy to overcome the unequal distribution of wealth on a 
global scale, and the idea emerged to extend into the business and 
industry realm to meet the needs of beneficiaries on a larger level.72 This 
“superior communion of goods” is now known as the “Economy of 
Communion,” and officially originated in 1991 in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and 
later spread worldwide.73 Brazil is the second largest economy to consist 
of EoCs, with 84 businesses (11%).74 Italy is the largest, having 242 
                                                                                                                                
 69. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 42-43 (noting that the Focolare spread through 
Brazil almost by chance meetings and personal contacts in the 1950s, and its spread in 
Brazil epitomizes the spread of the Movement in many countries); see also Uelmen & 
Bruni, supra note 66, at 649 (noting that Lubich was touched by Brazilians’ strong 
desire to have a more effective impact on the social problems in the country). 
 70. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 42-43 (noting that the monk started the same 
Movement when he returned to Brazil. Several Focolare followers gave up their modest 
standard of living and actually decided to live in the shacks similar to those in Recife, 
Brazil, giving what they had to the poor of the village and treating them as their equals. 
Eventually, they were able to convince the authorities to build a basic infrastructure on 
the island, and now the village has a school, health center, a pediatric hospital, a sewing 
workshop, and a brick factory). 
 71. GOLD, supra note 60, at 43. 
 72. GOLD, supra note 60, at 84-85; see also Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 649 
(noting that Lubich reflected on starting normal, for-profit businesses to increase 
employment and create profits). 
 73. GOLD, supra note 60, at 36; see also Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 649 
(noting that Focolare spread throughout the globe). 
 74. GOLD, supra note 60, at 92-93; see also Luigino Bruni, Economy of 
Communion: Between Market and Solidarity, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: 
TWILIGHT OR RENAISSANCE 241-42 (J.S. Boswell & F.P McHugh eds. 1999) (noting 
that as of 1999, 761 firms belonged to the EoC project, including 246 in Italy, 172 in 
Western Europe, 60 in Eastern Europe, 45 in North America, 49 in Central America, 
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businesses (33%), Germany follows with 84 businesses (7%), and the 
United States (5%).75 Focolare followers created a “culture of giving,” 
forming small commerical businesses that distributed profits to the poor, 
while keeping enough to sustain the businesses.”76 New possibilities 
emerged out of starting normal, for-profit businesses, which could 
increase employment opportunities and create profits.77 Twenty years 
later, 700 businesses worldwide follow the EoC Model.78 Most are small 
and medium in size, but some have more than one hundred employees, 
and they consist of various sectors in production and service.79 The 
United States alone has about forty-five EoCs, including an import-
export business, a law office, an accounting firm, an environmental 
consulting firm, a tutoring business, a violin shop, an apparel labeling 
shop, a goat farm, several restaurants and a chocolate factory.80 
b. A Model for Distributing Profits 
In addition to uniting people to further social good and creating a 
“culture of giving,” the EoC also presents a unique approach to the 
distribution of profits.81 The profits from an EoC business are generally 
split into three parts, according to the discretion of the business: the first 
                                                                                                                                
and 82 in Brazil). Differences between the two preceding sources may be attributed to 
different time periods. 
 75. GOLD, supra note 60, at 92-93. 
 76. GOLD, supra note 60, at 36, 85; see also Bruni, supra note 74, at 240 (noting 
that the “culture of giving” is a practical way for sharing the communion of goods 
among all members). 
 77. See Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 649-50; see also Bruni, supra note 74, 
at 240 (noting that businesses, new and existing, have adhered to this project by 
changing the way they operate their business). 
 78. Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 650 (noting that as of 2006, there are over 
700 businesses that follow the EoC model); see also Bruni, supra note 74, at 241 
(noting that as of 1991, there are 761 firms that belong to the EoC project). 
 79. Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 650; see also GOLD, supra note 60, at 103-
04 (explaining that EoCs operate within a number of sectors in the economy, including 
production/manufacturing, services, and retail sales). 
 80. Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 650-51 (naming some of the 45 EoC 
businesses in the United States, as of 2006); see also GOLD, supra note 60, at 106 
(noting that there are over 50 businesses with an EoC structure, as of 2010). 
 81. See generally GOLD, supra note 60, at 88-94 (noting that the desire to generate 
profits to share became one of the chief motivations behind starting up new businesses); 
see also Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 650 (noting that a structure based on this 
purpose could divide profits into three equal parts). 
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part is given to the materially poor, often directly linked to Focolare 
networks; the second part is kept in the firm for reinvestment; and the 
third part is used to sustain elements of infrastructure which promote 
and preserve what is known as the “culture of giving,” including 
programs for education and formation to help people live according to 
its values.82 After the owner decides how much he or she wants to 
reinvest in the company, the rest of the profits can be split equally 
between assisting those in need, and shaping activities for a culture of 
giving.83 In order to insure that the needs of the materially poor within 
Focolare communities are met, since 1994, profits from EoC businesses 
have been supplemented by personal donations from Focolare 
members.84 Thus, this division of profits can be seen as a useful model 
for any business with a charitable purpose for reasons discussed in Part 
III.85 
Notably, participation in the EoC and sharing profits is entirely 
voluntary among business owners and shareholders.86 Neither group has 
any legal obligation to give a portion of their profits to the EoC, but 
rather a decision to share the profits has to come from the people within 
the business itself.87 This structure provides the for-profit with the 
freedom of participating in the EoC to whatever extent it desires, 
                                                                                                                                
 82. GOLD, supra note 60, at 89, 93 (“the novelty of the project was initially seen as 
the division of the profits into three parts”: one part would be distributed to those in 
need, another would be re-invested into the company, and the third would be used to 
fund the infrastructure necessary to promote the culture of giving, i.e., model towns, 
publishing houses, formation centers); Bruni, supra note 74, at 241(noting that profits 
would be divided as such: one part would go to those in need, as in the early Christian 
communities; another would be used for the growth of the firm; and the last part would 
be used to develop structures to form “new people”, or people formed by love in the 
“culture of giving”). 
 83. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 93 (noting that the amount of reinvestment to be 
kept within the firm is at the discretion of the business owner); see also Uelmen & 
Bruni, supra note 66, at 650 (reasoning that one part should be used for the 
development of the business). 
 84. GOLD, supra note 60, at 93 (noting that since 1994, business profits have been 
supplemented by personal donations from people within the Movement, which have 
been redistributed either through network structure of the Movement, or through more 
structured development projects). 
 85. See infra Part III (CICs and L3Cs could use the EoC model). 
 86. GOLD, supra note 60, at 89 (noting that if the EoC sharing was not voluntary, 
the possibility of reaching “communion” between people would be taken away). 
 87.  Id. at 89-90. 
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without having to fit their agenda into some rigid guideline.88 While this 
freedom provides the possibility for widespread ownership by giving as 
many people as possible the chance to participate in the project in some 
form, it may have a negative impact on the shareholders, such as 
generating smaller dividends.89 As a result, the majority of the 
shareholders must agree with the ideals of the Focolare and be willing to 
forgo these returns.90 As one could imagine, this may mean that EoC and 
other hybrid entities adopting this model would have a difficult time 
operating as a publicly traded company, or in situations where 
management is separate from ownership.91 Nevertheless, it is possible 
that the growth of ethical investment funds within the stock market 
could stand as one method for raising business capital in an EoC model, 
or EoC companies could advocate for shareholders to forego dividends 
altogether and donate them to the EoC.92 
                                                                                                                                
 88. Id. at 90. 
 89. See id. at 90-91 (noting that the shareholders must receive less, and this 
decision must be consciously chosen by the shareholders, not forced on them). 
 90. See id. at 91 (contending that one of the initial objectives of the EoC was to 
ensure that the majority of the shareholders shared in the Focolare ideals and were 
prepared to forgo their dividends). 
 91. See id. at -57 (noting that the issue of whether the EoC could be applied in 
situations where management is separate from ownership will have to be considered as 
the EoC develops); see also Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 66, at 673-74 (noting that 
although EoC businesses probably will not be publicly traded on the U.S. stock 
exchange, the EoC model still strongly resembles the U.S. model of a for-profit buiness, 
and the EoC model may still serve as a multi-dimensional way to reflect on economic, 
legal, social and managerial aspects of business life). 
 92. See GOLD, supra note 60, at 157 (“The growth of ethical investment funds 
within the stock market could provide one avenue for rasing business capital in the 
future. Future listed EOC companies would take this trend one step further by 
advocating that shareholders forgo dividends altogether and donate them to the EOC.”). 
One example of troubles that an EoC may face was seen in the following: An EoC 
business in the Philippines, Giacomino’s Pizzas, was formed in 1991 by its owner and 
director, Noel Castro, after he was inspired by the idea of the Economy of Communion 
and thus, created this pizza and pasta family business. The business expanded and saw 
rapid growth, with fifteen restaurants countrywide. But this growth presented serious 
problems, requiring high levels of capital investment. Thus, they decided to sell the 
company to their competitors to protect the interests of the employees, and even though 
the company lost its EoC status, they used the profits to create new, smaller ventures 
with similar objectives, such as Chinese fast food (Ho Lee Chow). Id. at 105-106. 
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Finally, the EoC differs from other business models in at least four 
distinct ways when compared to a standard company.93 First, pay 
structure is organized differently in the EoC model. Under the EoC, 
employers increase wages to reward employees for the extra effort they 
put into the company, and to maximize efficiency of the company.94 
Second, the EoC provides for unique recruitment policies.95 EoC 
companies, for instance, have as one goal the hiring of more employees 
and giving those employees who make mistakes a second chance; the 
EoC business reintegrates those facing difficulties into the work 
environment, yet balances this principle with maximizing efficiency.96 
Third, EoC companies use participative management, which encourages 
workers to participate in decision-making within the business.97 For 
example, this can include organizing councils, meetings, and other 
formal structures to foster increased communication between different 
levels of authority.98 Finally, EoC companies take action to promote 
community spirit within the business.99 This could involve events to 
increase the social interaction among employees, including parties for 
the employees’ children.100 
                                                                                                                                
 93. Id. at 136. 
 94. See id. (noting that the first internal change within EoC ventures was a re-
evaluation of the companies’ compensation practices, such as wage increases to fulfill 
EoC obligations to the poor, and to maximize the efficiency of the company. One way 
this could be accomplished is if a certain group in need was given employment at the 
EoC). 
 95. See id. at 137 ("The second main internal change was a new attitude toward 
creating employment. Half of the EoC businesses decide to employ more people."). 
 96. See id. at 137 (noting that more people were employed, and employees were 
viewed through the lens of the EoC, especially young people with difficulties, i.e., 
giving a young boy with drug problems a second chance, even if he did not understand 
what was being said or contributed in terms of productivity). However, workers are still 
hired and fired; thus many EoC businesses try to find a balance between not harming 
the business, as well as not harming the long-term plan of work they have. Id. at 138. 
 97. See id. at 139. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 140 (noting that social activities could also increase the community 
spirit within the business). 
 100. Id. at 141. 
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II. PART II: UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM MODELS 
The United States and United Kingdom models of hybrid entities 
are the most practical hybrids to discuss in this Note. Because statutes 
have been passed in both countries detailing aspects of their legal 
structures,101 this Note is able to explore both frameworks in order to 
propose a feasible structure to distribute profits. Indeed, neither the L3C 
or CIC statutes, nor commentary discussing the statutes, have provided a 
model for how these hybrids can distribute their profits. Part II proceeds 
by first explaining the legal structures of these models. Section A begins 
by discussing the legal structure and statutory implications of L3Cs in 
the United States, acknowledging the apparent weaknesses in this 
model. Section B then discusses the more developed and concrete legal 
structure of CICs in the United Kingdom. This Section concludes by 
suggesting that both models, in fact, face a lack of defined structure for 
distributing profits.  
A. THE UNITED STATES MODEL: LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 
1. Objectives and Legal Structure 
One example of a hybrid entity that has received a reasonable 
amount of attention in the United States is the L3C, as evidenced by the 
passage of L3C statutes in five states.102 The L3C is a specific type of 
Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) that shares a similar structure.103 
                                                                                                                                
 101. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B and accompanying text. Belgium also attempted 
using a hybrid form by creating a corporate form called Société á Finalité Sociale 
(“SFS”). Doeringer, supra note 2, at 308. However, SFSs have not been widely used, 
due to their lack of clear advantages. Id. at 309. 
 102. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text (listing statutory provisions for 
L3Cs). Another hybrid in the United States is the “B Corporation,” which takes into 
account the interests of the community and the environment along with shareholder 
interests. See Billitteri, supra note 19, at 12. This Note does not discuss B Corporations 
because the L3C is more developed in several ways. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 642 
(stating that the B Corporation only offers moral, rather than legal assurances to non-
shareholder interests, and that stakeholders have no structural rights in governance). It 
remains to be seen whether B Corporations will have strong teeth. Id. at 643; see also 
infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text (discussing L3C statutes). 
 103. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (stating that the L3C reverts back to 
an LLC if it doens’t meet certain requirements). See also Doeringer, supra note 2, at 
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One difference, however, is that the L3C is structured to be able to 
receive Program Related Investments (“PRIs”) from foundations, which 
are grants that enable the foundation to generate a return from the 
nonprofit entity.104 Another difference is that while L3Cs are organized 
as LLCs—they are designated as “low-profit organizations” with 
specific charitable or educational goals—L3Cs are for-profit in the sense 
that they can distribute profits, and are nonprofit in the sense that they 
are organized for charitable purposes.105 
The L3C’s objective in being able to qualify for PRIs is that doing 
so signals to the market that these entities do have a for-profit structure 
but will also participate to some extent in the furtherance of social 
goals.106 PRIs have an essential role in the structure of the L3C hybrid 
model.107 PRIs are basically investments made by nonprofit, tax-exempt 
private foundations that are entitled to two forms of special treatment: 
                                                                                                                                
316 (noting that the similarities that L3Cs have to LLCs is that both models generally 
limit owners’ liability to their investment, and both use contracts to operate as either a 
partnership or corporation. This allows the L3C, like the LLC, to issue equity to raise 
capital); Reiser, supra note 4, at 621 (explaining that the L3C retains much of the 
LLC’s flexibility, and the L3C takes the LLC form as its base). 
 104. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; see also Doeringer, supra note 
2, at 316 (“[T]he crucial difference between the L3C and the LLC (and for-profit 
corporations) is that the format is designed to make it easy for L3Cs to receive PRIs 
from foundations. This creates the possibility of raising a significant amount of capital 
for social enterprises.”); Reiser, supra note 4, at 622 (contending that the L3C model 
was intended to fit into various LLC bases so that properly formed L3Cs would qualify 
to receive PRIs). 
 105. Taylor, supra note 3, at 761; see also Billiteri, supra note 19, at 13 (noting the 
use of an LLC to advance a social mission). 
 106. Taylor, supra note 3, at 762; see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 622 (noting that 
the inventors of the L3C designed the entity to meet PRI criteria, which is generally to 
meet a charitable purpose). 
 107. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the benefit of PRIs); 
see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 755 (noting that “PRIs could provide non-profits a 
valuable source of revenue because they are beneficial for both the provider and the 
recipient, they are flexible, and they make economic sense”); see also Doeringer, supra 
note 2, at 317 (noting that PRIs can be an extremely valuable resource, as demonstrated 
by the Ford Foundation’s use in 1968, “when it committed $10 million for investments 
in socially beneficial companies rather than the traditional grants to charities. Congress 
quickly followed by adding PRIs to the list of acceptable disbursements of foundation 
assets in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Since that point, the Ford Foundation has 
committed $400 million in PRIs.”) (citing Ford Foundation, Investing for Social Gain: 
Reflections on Two Decades of Program-Related Investments 7-12 (1991)). 
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first, like most grants, PRIs can constitute part of the five percent 
“distribution percentage” that private foundations must use for 
charitable purposes annually; secondly, PRIs are not considered 
“jeopardizing investments,” which can subject private foundations to 
costly excise taxes.108 Additionally, in order for an investment to qualify 
as a PRI, its primary purpose must be to “accomplish one or more of the 
purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.”109 Likewise, L3Cs have the same “purpose” requirement, 
precisely to signal to private foundations and other investors that it is an 
entity created to meet the PRI requirements.110 
Another important aspect of PRIs is their tax classification. In 
terms of taxation, the L3C adopts the tax treatment of LLCs,111 which 
are taxed as partnerships.112 Thus LLCs, and by extension, L3Cs, are 
treated as “pass through entities,” where the entity itself is not subject to 
taxation on its income, but profits and income are allocated to the 
members who pay taxes according to their own tax status.113 For 
example, if the member has tax-exempt status—i.e., a public charity or a 
private foundation—the profits it earns can avoid federal income tax.114  
Furthermore, the LLC governance structure is fairly flexible, which 
stands to benefit the L3C’s social agenda.115 For example, customized 
                                                                                                                                
 108. Reiser, supra note 4, at 622; see also Doeringer, supra note 2 at 317 (holding 
that foundations can make PRIs that count toward the 5% requirement, and also 
accomplish an exempt purpose). Thus, PRIs would benefit a L3C.  
 109. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2006) (defining a “charitable or educational 
purpose” as: “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals”); Reiser, supra note 
4, at 622. 
 110. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B); Reiser, supra note 4, at 623 (requiring the entity to be 
formed for a charitable purpose reinforces the L3C’s position as an entity created to 
meet the PRI requirements).  
 111. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 623 (“the L3C relies heavily on the tax treatment of 
LLCs to produce its desired effect.”).  
 112. See id. (“since 1997, LLCs have been treated as partnerships under federal 
income tax law.”). Partnerships only have one level of tax, unlike Corporations, which 
are taxed twice. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2009). 
 113. See 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2006); Reiser, supra note 4, at 624.  
 114. See 26 U.S.C. §701 (2006); Reiser, supra note 4, at 624. 
 115. See id. at 625-26 (“the hallmark of LLC law is flexibility”). L3Cs can have 
either a member-managed LLC, which resembles a general partnership where many of 
the members are also the owners; or it can have a manager-managed LLC, which 
resembles a limited partnership where ownership and management are separated. Id. 
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rules in the company’s operating agreement could specify the social 
mission of the organization, alternative uses for proceeds, or interests of 
the company other than shareholder profit-maximization.116 In addition, 
the operating agreement can also restrict the transferability of shares to 
ensure that only those who agree with the ideals of the social mission 
would become involved with the company.117 Each of these 
modifications helps L3Cs encourage their social agenda by ensuring that 
the company’s goals extend beyond shareholder profit-maximization 
and appeal to a board class of investors.118 
Despite the structural advantages of L3Cs discussed above, 
difficulties in determining whether PRIs are trustworthy investments 
presents a weakness in the model.119 Specifically, it is cumbersome and 
costly to determine what qualifies as a PRI, since foundations have yet 
to use PRIs on a large scale.120 Furthermore, L3C statutes require L3Cs 
to follow IRS mandates, and foundations are hesitant to use PRIs with 
L3Cs, without the IRS issuing an official statement that investments in 
L3Cs constitute PRIs.121  As a result, L3Cs attempt to make it easier and 
                                                                                                                                
See also Taylor, supra note 3, at 762 (noting the LLC is flexible, and maintains a 
recognized business model). 
 116. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 762 (signifying that the operating agreement can be 
drafted to include express provisions regarding the organization’s social mission and 
interests other than profit maximization); see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 627 (noting 
that default provisions in the operating agreement may be varied to a significant 
degree). 
 117. Taylor, supra note 3, at 762; see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 629 (noting that 
transferability of shares will impact the governance and financing of L3Cs). 
 118. Taylor, supra note 3, at 762 (noting that this method is a way for members to 
ensure that the goals of the L3C and the Board of Directors does not only focus on 
shareholder profit-maximization); see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 629 (noting that this 
L3C framework could appeal to both foundations and a broader class of investors). 
 119.  See Reiser, supra note 4, at 628 (“Because the PRI regulations specifically bar 
foundations from contemplating a financial return as a motive for investment, this 
tranche of members would be given scant or very remote rights to distributions.”); see 
also infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 317 (“[I]t can be difficult for foundations to 
determine when they can make acceptable PRIs with companies achieving an exempt 
purpose and producing a profit.”); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 755 (noting that 
PRIs are not widely used because making a PRI requires complex documentation, and 
there is no coordinated market for PRIs). 
 121. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing when jeopardizing 
investments can arise); Reiser, supra note 4, at 647 (noting that if the IRS issued a 
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less costly for foundations to determine when they can safely invest with 
PRIs by remaining focused on exempt purposes.122 One solution in terms 
of re-investing in funds, is for L3Cs to access funds through “layered 
investing,” which would use PRIs to invest in the L3C at a below-
market rate of return.123 This low return investment will allow the L3C 
to contribute to a larger share of profits toward market-oriented 
investors, which would raise their potential economic return.124  
2. Statutory Implications 
In order to understand the feasibility and necessity of a hybrid 
entity that allows for distribution of profits, it is helpful to examine a 
legal structure of a statutory model, the L3C. In the United States, five 
states have passed L3C statutes: Vermont was the first in April 2008,125 
and Illinois, Michigan, Utah, and Wyoming followed in 2009.126 It is 
perhaps too early to tell how the L3C will function in practice, however, 
it has “quickly become a widely available choice of form.”127 Take for 
instance, the Vermont statute which has the following requirements: 
(A) (i) The company significantly furthers the accomplishment of 
one or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning 
                                                                                                                                
ruling, which it has not done yet, that a state-sanctioned L3C would pre-qualify as a 
proper PRI, foundations’ fears of investing in PRIs would be eased); Doeringer, supra 
note 2, at 321 (noting that the IRS has not issued a statement that will automatically 
allow investments in L3Cs to count as PRIs, and thus, many foundations are hesitant to 
use PRIs with L3Cs because of the chance that their investments will be labeled as 
“jeopardizing investments”). 
 122. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 319 (For example, each L3C is contractually 
bound to an exempt purpose. If the L3C stops operating for that exempt purpose, it will 
cease to be a L3C and revert back into an LLC, and the foundations will know not to 
commit PRIs to the company); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 762 (stating that the 
main intent of the L3C is to signal to foundations that the entity qualifies to receive 
PRIs). 
 123. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 319. 
 124. Id. 
 125. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2008). 
 126. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m) 
(West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009). Each jurisdiction has followed a similar pattern. See Reiser, 
supra note 4, at 621. This Note focuses on the Vermont statute, since it was the most 
recently passed. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
 127. Reiser, supra note 4, at 620-21.  
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of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 
U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B),128 and (ii) would not have been formed but 
for the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of charitable 
or educational purposes; (B) No significant purpose of the company 
is the production of income or the appreciation of property; (C) No 
purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more political or 
legislative purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D);129 (D) 
If a company that met the definition of this subdivision (23) at its 
formation at any time ceases to satisfy any one of the requirements, 
it shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability 
company.130 
Although section A may provide, for example, that a company 
“significantly furthers . . . charitable or educational purposes . . . ,” there 
is no explicit mention of profit distribution in L3C statutes.131 
Nevertheless, it seems clear from exploring the statutory language that 
no explicit limitations have been outlined resitrcting how investors 
interested in the L3C form can distribute their profits; rather, it appears 
that broad discretion is given to the owner to determine how he or she 
wishes to manage the structure of the company.132 This leaves open the 
possibility of implementing a new structure for profit distribution, such 
as the EoC model, that will be compatible with the L3C's legal 
structure.133 
                                                                                                                                
 128. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2006) provides that a “charitable or educational 
purpose” is “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” 
 129. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) provides that a political or legislative purpose is one 
“which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of 
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on 
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”. 
 130. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2008). 
 131. See supra notes 125-26, 128-30 and accompanying text (no mention of profit 
distribution in the L3C statutes). 
 132. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2008). 
 133. See id. 
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B. THE UNITED KINGDOM MODEL: COMMUNITY INTEREST 
COMPANIES 
The main hybrid form in the United Kingdom is the CIC.134 CICs 
were created and amended into the U.K. company law in 2004 primarily 
to “improve access to finance . . . and preserve assets and profits solely 
for social purposes.”135 Since the 2004 amendment, over five thousand 
CICs in the United Kingdom have been created, showing the rapid 
spread of this movement.136 
Most of the CIC framework is guided by U.K. company law, and is 
regulated by the CIC regulator, a new office of the Regulator of 
Companies.137 Like other U.K. companies, CICs must register and then 
apply to the Regulator for their special community interest status.138 One 
unique characteristic of the CIC is that it must meet a “community 
interest benefit test,” which is satisfied “if a reasonable person might 
consider that its activities are being carried on for the benefit of the 
community.”139 The CIC must submit a report detailing its community 
interest achievements annually to the Regulator to see if the company’s 
activities are really being carried on for the benefit of the community.140 
                                                                                                                                
 134. This form is available in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. See 
Reiser, supra note 4, at 630; see also The Regulator of the Community Interest 
Companies, Community Interest Companies Information Pack, DEP’T. FOR BUS. 
INNOVATION & SKILLS, 4 (Mar. 2010), http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/cic 
regulator/docs/leaflets/10-1387-community-interest-companies-information-pack.pdf 
(hereinafter Information Pack). 
 135. Reiser, supra note 4, at 630.  
136.There are currently 6,100 companies registered as CICs. See The Regulator of the 
Community Interest Companies, List of Community Interest Companies (2009), DEP’T. 
FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, http://www.bis.gov.uk/cicregulator/cic-register (last 
visited January 31, 2012). 
 137. Taylor, supra note 3, at 765; see also The Regulator of the Community Interest 
Companies, Homepage, DEP’T. FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, http://www.cicregul 
ator.gov.uk/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
 138. See Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004 c. 
27, § 36 (Eng.) (stating that the Regulator must decide whether the company is eligible 
to be formed as a community interest company). 
 139. See id. at § 35(4). 
 140. See id. at § 34(1) (requiring that directors of a community interest company 
prepare an annual report (“community interest company report”) in respect of each 
financial year regarding the company’s activities during the financial year); The 
Regulator of the Community Interest Companies, Frequently Asked Questions, DEP’T. 
FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, 11 (Oct. 2009), http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bis 
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Notably, the community benefited does not have to be in the United 
Kingdom, allowing for this enterprise to be used worldwide.141 
Nevertheless, this test is generally not satisfied if the CIC aims to 
benefit a small number of people or support a particular political 
party.142 The Regulator has defined “small” or “community” to mean a 
group that can be clearly defined and considered a genuine section of 
the community, as viewed by a reasonable person.143 For example, “my 
family,” “my friends” or “regular drinkers of ABC beer,” are unlikely to 
be eligible to form a CIC, since they would be benefiting only a small 
group of people with no indication of a charitable purpose.144 
As for taxation, CICs are not entitled to any tax exemptions or 
benefits.145 With respect to, CICs are required to only have one director, 
as opposed to other companies which must have two or more 
directors.146 Further, in a typical company, directors must pursue the 
interests of shareholders, and the only other interests they may consider 
                                                                                                                                
partners/cicregulator/docs/leaflets/09-1648-community-interest-companies-frequently-
asked-questions-leaflet.pdf (hereinafter FAQ) (ensuring the government’s oversight that 
CICs act in the public interest by requiring CICs to produce an annual report “on how 
they are delivering for the community and how they are involving their stakeholders in 
their activities”). 
 141. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 313; see also Information Pack, supra note 134, at 
9 (reasoning that the community will usually be wider than just the members of the 
CIC). 
 142. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 313. 
 143. See Information Pack, supra note 134, at 9 (noting that a community is defined 
“against the overall background of the view which a reasonable person would take of 
what constituted a section of the community for the purposes of the community interest 
test”). 
 144. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 631 (“[I]n the area of taxation, CIC status does not 
confer any benefits beyond those available to other U.K. companies.”); The Regulator 
of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 7.6 (2008), 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/cicregulator/guidance (hereinafter Information and Guidance 
Notes) (“CICs will not receive tax breaks from the Inland Revenue by virtue of their 
legal status.”). Thus, if a charity decides to convert into a CIC, it will automatically lose 
its charity tax status. Id. at 2.4.1. 
 146. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 632 (explaining that CICs organized as private 
companies may have one director, while other companies must have two or more); 
FAQ, supra note 140, at 13 (stating that since the CIC is not a public limited company 
which must have two directors, it is only required to have one director). 
288 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
are those of employees, or other factors related to the company.147 
Conversely, in a CIC, the director’s main objective is to look out for the 
interests of other stated community purposes, and thus their goals are 
not to solely benefit shareholders.148 CIC law also prepares a role for its 
members in the CICs governance structure, depending on whether the 
CIC is limited by shares, or limited by guarantee.149 For example, in a 
CIC limited by shares, the members are generally shareholders; whereas 
in a CIC limited by guarantee, the members will generally be donors or 
members admitted according to the terms specified by the CIC.150 
Although members do not hold any management rights as U.S. 
shareholders do, they do possess notable rights such as the election and 
removal of directors, amending the company’s original documents, and 
approving major transactions.151 Members should also monitor the 
performance of the directors, who are responsible for ensuring that the 
CIC is meeting the requirements of the community interest test.152 
                                                                                                                                
 147. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.) (“A director of a company must 
act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole . . . . ”); see also Reiser, supra 
note 4, at 632 (“In a typical company limited by shares, directors should pursue the 
interests of the shareholder members in good faith and need only consider other 
interests such as employees or the environment in their decision-making.”). 
 148. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 632 (noting that a director of a CIC or other 
company who has purposes other than shareholder-profit maximization (i.e., charities 
set up as companies limited by guarantee), has these alternative stated purposes as his 
or her primary goals); Information and Guidance Notes, supra note 145, at § 2.3 (noting 
that the CIC’s activities are carried on for the purpose of benefiting a particular 
community). 
 149. Reiser, supra note 4, at 633; Information and Guidance Notes, supra note 145, 
at § 9.1.3. 
 150. See Information and Guidance Notes, supra note 145, at § 9.1.3 (“In a 
company limited by shares, the members are usually the shareholders subject to the 
provisions included in the articles of association. In a company limited by guarantee, 
the members are usually the subscribing guarantors and others admitted to membership 
according to the articles of association.”). 
 151. See id. (“Although the day to day running of the company may be delegated to 
the directors, subject to company law and the articles of association of the company, the 
ultimate control of the CIC and responsibility for major policy and other decisions rests 
with the members . . . For example, they can appoint and dismiss the directors, delegate 
powers to the directors, declare dividends, approve major transactions and change the 
constitution of the company.”).  
 152. Id.  
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Moreover, another unique characteristic of the CIC is that its assets 
are subject to an “asset lock.”153 This essentially ensures that the CIC’s 
assets are used, or “locked up” for the charitable purpose.154 The asset 
lock prohibits the CIC from disposing of assets for less than their fair 
market value, except if the disposal is in furtherance of the CIC’s 
specific community benefit purpose, or if it transfers the assets to 
another CIC or charity.155 Thus, if the CIC is dissolved, the asset lock 
ensures that after all liabilities have been paid out, the remaining assets 
will be transferred to another CIC, a charity, or a foreign equivalent to a 
charity upon dissolution.156 Essentially locking assets into community 
benefit purposes, the Regulator views the asset lock as a fundamental 
feature of the CIC financial structure.157 
In addition to the asset lock, CICs also have important financial 
limits regarding dividends. The CIC is allowed to pay out dividends to 
its members only if the Regulator authorizes such dividend payments 
through regulations.158 The Regulator has subjected these dividend 
payments to three types of restrictions: first, dividends per share may not 
exceed five percent if issued before April 6, 2010, and shares issued 
after this date shall be capped at twenty percent of the paid-up value of a 
share; second, the total dividends for all shares cannot exceed thirty-five 
                                                                                                                                
 153. See id. at § 6.1. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. (stating that the “asset lock” ensures that the CIC’s assets are used for the 
community purpose for which the CIC was formed, and if the assets are transferred out 
of the CIC, the transfer must satisfy one of these requirements: the CIC retains the 
value of the assets transferred, it is made to another asset-locked body (CIC or charity) 
or other asset-locked body with the consent of the Regulator, or is otherwise made for 
the benefit of the community); see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 634-35 (noting that the 
asset lock prohibits disposal of the assets for less than their fair market value, except if 
the assets are given to another CIC or charity. Upon dissolution, assets may not be paid 
out to directors, members or shareholders, but must be transferred to another entity 
whose assets are devoted to a community benefit. This is a fundamental feature of the 
CIC). But see Taylor, supra note 3, at 766 (noting that the asset lock is a limitation, 
since it may inhibit potential investors from investing in the entity, and courts in other 
jurisdictions may view the asset lock as an unwarranted restraint on capital). 
 156. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 313; Information and Guidance Notes, supra note 
145, at § 4.3. 
 157. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text; see also Reiser, supra note 4, 
at 635. 
 158. Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004 § 
30(1) (Eng.). 
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percent of distributable profits; third, unused dividends cannot remain 
unused for more than five years.159 
One example of a successful CIC is NextGenUS, a community 
broadband company that provides high-speed internet, and the only 
current national CIC in the United Kingdom.160 NextGenUS chose the 
CIC form because it focuses on community benefit, and because the 
company wanted to differentiate itself from competition, including 
distinguishing its structural form.161 The company distributes its profits 
by reinvesting sixty-five percent of the profits earned in the community 
and by using an asset lock.162 Although one can assume that the other 
thirty-five percent is used for company purposes, NextGenUS does not 
explicitly state that assertion; the community is free to spend the sixty-
five percent as it pleases, with regulations issued by the CIC.163 Thus, 
this may offer a helpful model for someone desiring to set up a CIC, and 
looking for a concrete way to distribute the company’s profits, since we 
see that the community really controls how profits are spent.164 
However, smaller companies may not be able to adopt this model. Thus, 
while both the CIC and the L3C have various legal structural 
requirementsneither statutes nor commentary on these hybrids have 
offered a practical model for distributing their profits for those who have 
an interest in the hybrid form. The EoC model offers one resolution to 
this issue. 
III. PART III: LINKING HYBRID FORMS WITH EOC PROFIT 
SHARING 
Although the CIC model may have some advantages over the L3C 
model, neither model has provided a concrete structure for the 
distribution of profits.165 In order to provide guidelines for a clear profit-
distribution method, Part III seeks to combine aspects of the EoC profit-
                                                                                                                                
 159. FAQ, supra note 140, at 16. 
 160. See Community Interest Companies, NEXTGENUS.CO.UK, http://www.next 
genus.co.uk/cic/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165. See supra Part II.A-B; see also infra notes 173-76, 179-80 and accompanying 
text (reasoning that the CIC was passed in national, rather than regional law, and it 
gained public approval by the United Kingdom).  
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sharing structure with the characteristics of both L3Cs and CICs. 
Specifically, Part III of this Note proceeds by first providing some 
general lessons the United States’ L3C model can learn from the United 
Kingdom’s CIC model in Section A. Next, Section B argues that the 
EoC profit-sharing model is a useful structure for the L3C model. 
Finally, Section C argues that the EoC profit-sharing model can also be 
a useful structure for the CIC model in the United Kingdom. 
A. WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM ABROAD AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS 
Compared to the L3Cs complete flexibility,166 CIC governance and 
financial limitations impose a rather rigid structure and framework.167 
The CIC appears to be fostering enthusiasm in social enterprise and is 
helping provide much needed revenue streams for social services in the 
United Kingdom.168 Therefore, it has been argued that U.S. policy-
makers need to learn from the different experience of the United 
Kingdom.169 The reasoning behind this argument is, at least in part, that 
the U.K. government has shown it is capable of succeeding in: (1) 
increasing access to capital, and (2) creating an environment to ensure 
the public is aware of social enterprise.170 Indeed, the United Kingdom 
has succeeded in increasing its assets to capital, and the United States can 
follow by endorsing the allocation of PRIs from foundations to L3Cs.171 
                                                                                                                                
 166. See supra notes 103-105, 131-33 (discussing the flexibility of the L3C model). 
 167. See Reiser, supra note 4, at 636 (stating that the fairly rigid structure of CICs 
empowers both shareholders and a dedicated external regulator to enforce); see also 
supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder rights in a CIC); 
supra notes 9103-105, 131-33 (discussing the flexibility of the L3C model). 
 168. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 322 (noting that the CIC has succeeded in 
increasing access to capital for social enterprises); see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 648 
(commenting that the CIC seems to be the most likely hybrid form to confront the 
greatest challenges in financing hybrid forms). 
 169. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 321; see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 651 
(commenting that while the L3C may be subject to the same lack of rigor and efficiency 
as charities, the CIC offers a high degree of structural enforcement through its 
community benefit test, asset lock, and capped dividends). 
 170. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 321; see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 652 
(stating that the CIC does not solely rely on private and internal enforcement, but has a 
public backup system, at least for enforcing social commitments). 
 171. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 322 (stating that to increase capital as the CIC 
has done, foundations need to feel comfortable making PRIs to L3Cs); see also Reiser, 
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This can be done through federal legislation, and the Council of 
Foundations is currently advocating for such legislation “to create a 
streamlined system of fast-tracked review by the IRS where the L3Cs could 
apply for certification to receive PRIs.”172 It is further argued that the 
United States should consider achieving a uniform definition of social 
enterprise and invest in programs, in order to garner public support, and 
thus greater investment in such hybrid entities.173  
Furthermore, there are a number of other factors that have arguably 
contributed to the United Kingdom’s success with its hybrid form that 
has not been replicated in the L3C model.174 First, the CIC was amended 
into the United Kingdom’s company law, which is nationwide, rather 
than regional.175 This is in contrast to L3Cs, which in the United States 
are created through state statutes, rather than federal.176 This makes the 
process much slower and allows for differences to arise between 
different jurisdictions.177 Moreover, until now, L3Cs have not received 
approval from the IRS that they can invest in PRIs.178 
In addition, the United Kingdom has achieved public approval of 
the CIC form, while similar visibility and acceptance is still wanting in 
the United States.179 For example, the United Kingdom instituted the 
                                                                                                                                
supra note 4, at 647 (noting that if the IRS does not ensure the safety of making PRIs, 
potential funds will not be accessed). 
 172. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 322; see supra, note 121 and accompanying text; 
see also Issue Paper, Council on Foundations, Allow Foundations to Make Program-
Related Investments to L3Cs, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, (Mar. 2009).  
 173. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 322 (contending that for success, the 
government needs to help generate a broad, unified understanding social enterprise); 
see also Reiser, supra note 4, at 647 (noting that the success of the L3C would be 
dependent on the public, and how willing they would be to invest in an entity with a 
blended mission). 
 174. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (explaining that L3C statutes 
were passed under state legislation, rather than federal legislation, or the equivalent 
“national law” in the United Kingdom. 
 175. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (noting the broad discretion 
given to L3Cs in determining their legal structure). 
 178. See id.; see also supra notes 19-22, 119-24 and accompanying text 
(commenting on the caution taken in using PRIs). 
 179. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 321 (asserting that one lesson to be learned 
from the United Kingdom is the importance of creating an environment where the 
public is aware of and receptive to the benefits of social enterprise); id. 324 (“if 
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“community benefit test” to reassure the public that CICs were truly 
serving the community.180 The United States can enforce similar 
regulations through the IRS, or by having the secretaries of state lightly 
monitor the L3C activities.181 Nonetheless, it is essential for the 
government to provide the support and benefits to companies necessary 
to foster the growth of these new social hybrids and to publicize the 
potential positive impact of social enterprise.182 
1. How Profits Can be Distributed Within the L3C Model 
Since the L3C model has a more flexible structure than the CIC, a 
particularized approach needs to be taken to address how profits should 
be distributed.183 As previously discussed, the L3C model does not have 
any limitations as to how profits can be distributed, or the proportion in 
which profits may be split between reinvestment and the beneficial 
purpose.184 The L3C statute simply requires that the company: (i) 
significantly further a charitable or educational purpose; (ii) would not 
have been formed but for the charitable purpose; (iii) not pursue or 
otherwise involve itself in any political purposes; and (iv) not include 
income production or property appreciation as a significant purpose of 
the L3C.185 The EoC model of a three-part profits sharing entity is one 
plausible structure that can work into the L3C’s loose structure and 
provide a clear method of profit distribution.186 Under this model, the 
first group of profits would be distributed to those in need—that is, the 
                                                                                                                                
governments want to facilitate the growth of social enterprise, it is essential that they 
provide support and benefits for companies entering the sector.”). 
 180. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 323 (asserting that the community benefit test and 
the distribution limits help build public support for social enterprises by assuring the 
public that CICs are serving the community). 
 181. Doeringer, supra note 2, at 324. 
 182. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 324 (noting that the government’s efforts to 
publicize the potential positive impact of social-enterprise has enhanced the CIC’s 
branding power). 
 183. See supra notes 103-105, 131-33 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (providing the IRS’ definition 
of a “charitable purpose” and aspects that are prohibited by the L3C). 
 186. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (describing the three ways 
profits can be distributed: to the charitable purpose, reinvestment, and infrastructure). 
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charitable purpose at hand.187 The second part, reinvestment, could be 
kept in the business to foster a return, which is another main goal of the 
L3C.188 Finally, the third part would be used to maintain the 
infrastructure of the company or to contribute to organizations related to 
the charitable purpose.189 
Like the EoC model, the decision to invest the L3C’s profits in a 
charitable purpose would have to be the voluntary choice of both the 
directors and the shareholders.190 Indeed, if a company stops engaging or 
contributing to the EoC, it simply loses its EoC status.191 Likewise, if an 
L3C stops engaging in its charitable purposes, it would immediately lose 
its “L3C” status and continue as an LLC.192 Furthermore, the underlying 
purposes of the EoC also fit within the statutory limitations of the 
L3C.193 For example, in the Vermont statute, section (A)’s “charitable or 
educational purpose” is defined by 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which includes, “religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational” purposes.194 The values of the EoC would easily fit under 
religious or charitable.195 One advantage of the EoC model is that it is 
specifically designed to increase employment.196 Given the current high 
rate unemployment rate in the United States, the EoC model might 
provide an additional benefit through its various sectors of production 
and services.197   
                                                                                                                                
 187. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See supra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text (the EoC model must be the 
voluntary choice of the directors and shareholders). 
 191. See supra note 92 (providing an example of how an EoC lost its EoC status). 
 192. See supra note 122 (L3C lose their L3C status if they cease to operate in 
furtherance of the charitable purpose). 
 193. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (referring to the Vermont L3C 
statute). 
 195. See supra notes 109-10, 128 and accompanying text (naming the purposes for 
which a L3C may be organized). 
 196. See supra notes 77, 96 and accompanying text (EoC designed to increase 
employment). 
 197. See id; see also Economic Situation, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/ (last visited December 31, 2011) (noting that as of December 
2011, the unemployment rate in the United States was 8.5%); supra note 79 and 
accompanying text (noting that most EoCs consist of small to medium size companies 
in various sectors in production and service).197  
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2. How Profits Can be Distributed Within the CIC Model 
Even with the CIC’s more rigid structure, the specific three-fold 
structure of EoC profit sharing and its governance characteristics should 
still be able to fit well within the CIC model. In terms of the company’s 
governance structure, the EoC gives room for widespread participation 
in ownership among both the shareholders and directors, such that 
shareholders must actually agree to forego dividends and agree with 
pursuing the charitable purposes of the company.198 This would likely 
serve as one way of satisfying the community benefit test, and would 
also be included in the annual CIC report, which details how the 
directors are involving the stakeholders in the company’s activities.199 
Moreover, CICs, which are only required to have one director but allow 
members to participate in the governance aspects of the company, would 
also fit in neatly to the EoC model, given its flexibility.200 
Moreover, under existing requirements CIC profits must primarily 
be used for the benefit of the community and dividends cannot exceed 
the cap amount issued by the Regulator.201 While the EoC does aim to 
increase revenue, its main goal is to continue to fight poverty and 
unequal distribution of wealth on a global scale, such that shareholders 
may even need to forego dividends to achieve this goal.202 Likewise, the 
CIC has as its central ambition the “charitable purpose,” and therefore 
its existing regulations are unlikely to be incompatible with the 
incorporation of the EoC model.203 Since the CIC also seeks to raise 
revenue, the EoC model of distributing profits to the poor, re-investing a 
portion of profits in the company, and leaving a portion for 
                                                                                                                                
 198. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder’s 
role in the EoC). 
 199. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of 
the community interest test and the annual report). 
 200. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that CICs only require one 
director, and members of CICs also have significant rights). 
 201. See supra notes 139-44, 153-59, 148-49 and accompanying text (detailing CIC 
characteristics to ensure that profits are kept for the benefit of the community, including 
the community benefit test, the asset lock, and capped dividends). 
 202. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (noting that to meet the 
charitable purpose requirement, shareholders may receive lower dividends). 
 203. See supra notes 68, 72-76, 139-40 and accompanying text (noting the 
charitable purposes of the EoC and the CIC). 
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infrastructure, would fit well within the requirements of a community 
benefit test (i.e., the poor) and capped dividends (i.e., reinvestment).204 
Furthermore, not only would the CIC benefit from aspects of the 
EoC model, but its “community benefit test” would actually directly 
contribute to the goals of the EoC,205 such as funding companies to 
alleviate unequal distribution of wealth and assisting the less 
fortunate.206 In addition, the EoC model would work particularly well 
with the CIC model, given that the CIC, like the EoC, aims for the 
enterprise to be used worldwide.207 Moreover, the “asset lock” aspect of 
the CIC would also work well with the EoC model, since if the EoC/CIC 
model were to dissolve, the profits could remain within the EoC 
community.208 Indeed, the CIC statute allows for profits to be distributed 
to other CICs or charities, even abroad.209 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, it is worthwhile to highlight that both CIC and L3C 
hybrid legal structures are tied to charitable purposes. Indeed, a 
charitable purpose is the key behind the legal structure and the 
distribution of profits for each hybrid. Despite possessing developed 
terms within their legal structures, further discussion on profit 
distribution is wanting in order to help these entities effectively 
distribute a portion of their profits to a charitable purpose.  
This Note has explored the feasibility and benefits of incorporating 
aspects of the EoC profit distribution structure into the CIC and L3C 
models. Dividing profits into three portions: one portion for the 
charitable purpose, one for reinvestment in the firm, and the third for 
                                                                                                                                
 204. See supra notes 81-84, 139-44, 158-59, and accompanying text (merging CIC 
ideas of the community benefit test and capped dividends, and the EoC three-fold 
profit-sharing structure). 
 205. See supra note 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing the community 
benefit test). 
 206. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the EoC and its mission). 
 207. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that the CIC can be used 
worldwide); see supra notes 69, 73-75 and accompanying text (noting that the EoC 
evolved into a worldwide movement, and listing the main countries that have EoC 
companies). 
 208. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing the asset lock). 
 209. See supra note 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing asset distribution 
after dissolution). 
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infrastructure, provides a concrete and organized way to balance the 
dual purpose of these hybrids, which is to increase capital and contribute 
to the greater good of society. Significantly, the EoC profit-sharing 
model is both rigid enough to provide a concrete structure, but flexible 
enough to leave uncapped specific amounts for any of the three parts. 
Applying this profit structure to the CIC and L3C models will likely 
help these hybrids focus more on their charitable purposes, and provide 
further clarity on whether it is in the company’s best interest to keep the 
majority of profits in reinvestment, or for the charitable purpose. 
Finally, this Note has recognized that various aspects of these 
hybrids still remain undeniably vague, such as the meaning of 
“charitable purpose” and what constitutes a reasonable amount to donate 
to the charitable purpose. Nevertheless, EoC characteristics, and 
particularly profit distribution, provide a starting point to creating a 
more organized way to distribute these hybrid entities’ profits. 
 
 
